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ARTICLE
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*

In its 1984 decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,' the Supreme Court announced a two-step test applicable to
judicial review of agency constructions of agency-administered statutes. The
first step, hereinafter referred to as "Chevron step one," is to determine
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 2
"If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue,"' 3 then it reaches the second step of the analysis,
hereinafter referred to as "Chevron step two." In this step,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.4
Prior to Chevron, courts had frequently done what Chevron prohibited: they
imposed their own constructions on ambiguous agency-administered statutes.5
When they did so, these courts created binding precedent. The resulting difficulty involves reconciling the highly deferential Chevron doctrine with the
doctrine of stare decisis-a doctrine that requires adherence to prior decisions.6

* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am indebted to Brad Clark,
Greg Maggs, John Manning, Henry Monaghan, Josh Schwartz, Jonathan Siegel, and Peter Strauss for
providing helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842-43.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (interpreting insider trading provisions of federal
securities laws); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (interpreting provisions of Securities Exchange
Act); Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977) (interpreting provisions of Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
(interpreting employee protection exclusions of NLRA); Office Employees Int'l Union Local No. 11 v.
NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (interpreting provisions of NLRA regarding scope of NLRB's power over
unions acting as employers); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944) (interpreting
"public utilities" provisions of Emergency Price Control Act); see generally KENNETH CuLP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1 (1994).
6. See infra Part II.
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Both doctrines create meta-principles-broad principles of law that govern
large classes of cases.
The two-step test enunciated in Chevron and the doctrine of stare decisis have
the potential to yield inconsistent results in a variety of contexts. Conflicts can
arise between Chevron and both pre-Chevron and post-Chevron precedents.
Conflicts can also arise between Chevron and precedents announced by three
different institutions: the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and agencies. Finally,
conflicts can arise between precedents and either Chevron step one or Chevron
step two.
Neither the Supreme Court nor circuit courts have yet had occasion to resolve
conflicts between Chevron and stare decisis in every context in which such
conflicts can arise. Both have resolved a large number of conflicts in a variety of
contexts, however. The Supreme Court has announced a series of mechanical
rules for resolving most of the types of conflicts it has addressed to date. For
example, Supreme Court precedents always trump the deference owed under
Chevron,7 while agency and circuit court precedents appear to play no role in
the process of applying the Chevron test in most contexts.8 Circuit courts have
taken a distinctly different approach to resolution of conflicts between these two
meta-principles. For example, when an agency announces a construction of a
statute that conflicts with a circuit precedent, a court should reconsider the
continuing validity of the precedent in light of the results of its application of
the two-step test announced in Chevron.9
7. When an agency adopts a construction of a statute that a court would uphold as a "permissible"
construction of an ambiguous statute under Chevron if the issue were res nova, but in circumstances
where the Supreme Court previously adopted an inconsistent construction of the statute in a preChevron decision, the court is resolving a conflict between a Supreme Court precedent and Chevron.
The Court has held that stare decisis trumps Chevron in this context. Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
763, 768-69 (1996); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc.
v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103, 111-12 (1989). See infra Part IIIA.
8. Thus, for instance, the Court seems to attach no significance to the existence of long-standing
agency and circuit court precedents in the process of applying Chevron step one. See Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115 (1994); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,
512 U.S. 267 (1994); City of Chicago v. Enivronmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994); Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also infra Parts IIIB, Ic.
9. In such circumstances, circuit courts have devised several creative and thoughtful means of
attempting to integrate Chevron and stare decisis. The Tenth and Third Circuits have concluded that a
court should analyze the precedent decisions with care to determine whether they reflect a judicial
determination that the statute has a meaning that is inherently inconsistent with the agency construction
at issue or reflect instead a judicial determination that a prior agency construction inconsistent with the
present construction was "reasonable." In the second class of cases, the apparent conflict between
Chevron and stare decisis disappears through the process of accurate characterization of the precedent.
See NLRB v. Viola Indus., 979 E2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988); see also infra
text accompanying notes 136-43. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that Chevron requires a court to
attempt to recharacterize a pre-Chevron precedent to determine whether the statutory interpretation
adopted in the precedent decision is inconsistent with Chevron. If the court concludes that it is, the
court must reconsider the precedent in light of Chevron and overrule it if it is inconsistent with the
results of application of the Chevron two-step. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d
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My goal in this article is to critique the ways in which courts have attempted
to reconcile the Chevron and stare decisis doctrines to date and to suggest
alternative methods of integrating these doctrines that would produce better
results, as measured with reference to the values that underlie the two doctrines.
In Part I, I describe the Chevron doctrine and the values it furthers. In Part H, I
describe the doctrine of stare decisis and the arguments scholars have made in
support of it, and I discuss the relevance of those arguments to administrative
lawmaking. In Part III, I describe cases in which courts have attempted to
reconcile the two doctrines in various contexts. In Part IV, I suggest a new
analytical framework for attempting to maximize simultaneously the values that
are furthered by the two doctrines and the conflict-resolving or conflict-avoiding
rules that logically follow from application of that framework in the many
contexts in which Chevron and stare decisis seem to require different results. I
argue that circuit courts have identified and applied methods of reconciling the
values of Chevron and stare decisis in several important contexts that are
superior to the mechanical rules that the Supreme Court has generally adopted
to date.
I.

THE VALUES FURTHERED BY THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE

The Court's opinion in Chevron announced and applied fundamental principles of constitutional law. It is one of the most important constitutional law
decisions in history, even though the opinion does not cite any provision of the
Constitution. In Chevron, the Court set forth for the first time a coherent
hierarchical relationship among the three branches of government that is consistent with the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and the basic
principles of democracy the Framers were attempting to further. When read in
conjunction with the Court's other modern opinions that resolve fundamental
structural issues,' ° Chevron also set forth, for the first time, a coherent analytical framework that anchors the modern administrative state securely within the
boundaries of the Constitution."
1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 144-48. The Second Circuit has
interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions as conferring discretion on a circuit court either to adhere to
a circuit precedent or to reconsider and overrule that precedent in light of the agency's construction and
the Chevron doctrine. The Second Circuit applies that approach both to pre-Chevron precedents and to
post-Chevron precedents. See Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993); see also infra text
accompanying notes 149-66.
10. Two lines of cases are particularly important in this respect. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court held that Congress can act in a way that
binds citizens and the President only by using the legislative process, including bicameralism and
presentment. In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the
Court announced limits on the power of Congress to insulate agency heads from control by the
President. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, §§ 2.4-2.5; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson,
Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (1988); see also Pievsky
v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1996) (interpreting Morrison v. Olson as conferring on the President
plenary power to remove an officer who has the power to make policy decisions).
11. For efforts to integrate the Court's opinions that address structural issues, see 1 DAVIS & PIERCE,
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The Court accomplished these feats in a remarkably simple, logical manner.
The Court began its analysis by reconceptualizing an entire class of disputes.
Traditionally, the Court had characterized all disputes with respect to the
interpretation of a statute as raising issues of law suitable for resolution by a
court. In Chevron, the Court acknowledged the reality that the process of
statutory construction often requires some institution or combination of institutions to resolve two dramatically different types of issues.
All issues that come before Congress are issues of policy until Congress
addresses them in some manner. 12 That is the only characterization that adequately describes the myriad issues Congress considers in the legislative
process, such as decisions whether to establish a particular regulatory or benefit
system, and decisions with respect to the substantive, procedural, and institutional characteristics of any such regulatory or benefit program. When Congress
enacts a statute that creates a regulatory or benefit system, it invariably resolves
some, but not all, of the hundreds of policy disputes that will arise in the process
of implementing the system created by the statute. The Chevron Court provided
a succinct summary of the reasons why the legislative process always leaves
some policy disputes unresolved:
Perhaps [Congress] ... consciously desired the [agency] ...to strike the

balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the [s]tatute ...would be in a better position
to do so; perhaps [Congress] . .. simply did not consider the question at this

level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of
to take their chances with the
the question, and those on each
1 3 side decided
agency.
the
by
devised
scheme
The Court concluded that "[f]or judicial purposes, it matters not which of these
things occurred." 14 The Court recognized that any time Congress enacts a
statute that does not resolve an interpretive question that arises in the process of
administering the statute, Congress has created the need for some other institution to resolve a policy dispute.1 5 Thus, the Court recognized that the process of
adopting constructions of an ambiguous statute is not resolution of an issue of
law, but resolution of a policy dispute. The Court assigned the task of resolving
supra note 5, §§ 2.4-2.5, 3.3; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 2071 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239 (1989); Pierce, supra note 10.
12. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview of Agency Interpretations
of Statutory Provisions,41 VAND.L. REv. 301 (1988).
13. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. For a more detailed discussion of these characteristics of the
legislative process, see Pierce, supra note 11, at 1244-47.
14. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
15. Id. at 865; see also Pauly v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (stating
"resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law"); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169 (1803) ("Questions ...which are, by the constitution and laws,
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.").
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such policy disputes to agencies. By contrast, the process of determining
whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to support an agency's construction
of the statute raises an issue of law that is suitable for judicial resolution.
The Chevron doctrine simultaneously furthers six goals: (1) it allocates
policymaking power in a manner consistent with the need for political accountability; (2) it provides a method of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine; (3) it
defines the constitutionally permissible place of agencies in government; (4) it
provides the Supreme Court a means to enhance its ability to control the
growing, decentralized, and ideologically diverse judicial branch; (5) it provides
a means to further the values of due process and equal protection in the context
of the administrative state; and (6) it provides a means through which agencies
can construct consistent and coherent benefit and regulatory programs.
A.

ALLOCATION OF POLICYMAKING POWER

The Chevron two-step establishes a simple constitutionally driven institutional hierarchy for resolving policy disputes. Step one places Congress and the
legislative process at the top of the hierarchy. If Congress has made a policy
decision through the constitutionally prescribed legislative process-including
bicameralism and presentment-"that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.' 16 That part of the institutional hierarchy is not new, of course. The
Court has long acknowledged the principle of legislative supremacy in the
context of nonconstitutional decisionmaking. 17
Step two of Chevron, however, reverses another part of the institutional
hierarchy the Court had traditionally recognized:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is
18
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Thus, agencies are in a position below Congress but above courts in the
institutional hierarchy in the policymaking context.
The Court anchored that part of the new institutional hierarchy securely in the
Constitution through a three-step process. First, the Court recognized that the
process of adopting a construction of an ambiguous statute is the process of
resolving a policy dispute.1 9 Second, the Court recognized that agencies are
16. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
17. See generally Daniel Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281 (1989).
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
19. Id. at 865.
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politically accountable institutions: "While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices ....
,,EO In
other words, the Court attributed to the President the policy decisions of
agencies and implicitly invited the electorate to hold the President politically
accountable for all such decisions. Once the Court equated the process of
adopting constructions of ambiguous statutes with the process of resolving
policy disputes and held that the President is vicariously responsible for all
agency policy decisions, the third step in the process of divining a constitutionally permissible hierarchy followed logically from the dramatically different
characteristics of the competing institutions:
Judges ...are not part of either political branch of the Government ....In
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgements ....
In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.21
B. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

The Court has long held that the Constitution assigns Congress exclusive
power to legislate and that Congress cannot delegate that power to any other
institution.2 z The Court has encountered seemingly insurmountable problems in
its efforts to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, however. 3 With the exception
of two unusual cases,24 decided the same day in 1935, the Court has upheld
every statute that has been challenged as violative of the nondelegation doctrine.2 5 For the first two centuries of the Court's existence, its efforts to enforce
the nondelegation doctrine can be characterized as a process of constantly
reducing its expectations of the legislative process to accommodate the results
of that process. The Court would announce a test for applying the doctrine, but
it then would replace that test with a less demanding test as soon as it was
confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute that could not
pass the previously announced test.2 6 Through multiple iterations of this process, the Court was able to say that it was enforcing the doctrine without
actually enforcing it.
In 1989, the Court switched to a more candid description of its approach to
20. Id.
21. Id. at 865-66.
22. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
23. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 2.6.
24. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935) (invalidating
provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-30
(1935) (same).
25. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 2.6.
26. Id.
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the nondelegation doctrine. The Court began to acknowledge the reality that it
had abandoned its efforts to enforce the nondelegation doctrine because it had
been unable to devise a justiciable standard that would allow it to distinguish
between constitutionally tolerable and unconstitutional delegations of broad
policymaking power to agencies. 27 In an important sense, however, the Court
has overstated its failure to devise an effective mechanism to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine. The Chevron doctrine is such a mechanism. 28 Indeed,
the Chevron two-step may be the only viable mechanism to enforce the nondelegation doctrine that is both effective and justiciable.29
Chevron sends a clear message to the Legislative Branch: If you make a
policy decision through the legislative process, we will enforce that decision
against the President through the application of Chevron step one; if, however,
you decline to make a policy decision through the legislative process, we will
deem your failure to so act as ceding the power to make that policy decision to
the President. Prior to Chevron, Congress could enact a broad and ambiguous
statute with the realistic expectation that the judiciary would make most of the
policy decisions that arise under the statute through the process of statutory
construction. Many members of Congress were perfectly content to avoid
resolving major policy disputes and to take their chances that the judiciary

27. Since 1989, the Court has upheld four statutes against claims that they violated the nondelegation doctrine. See Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1744-49 (1996) (upholding provisions of
Uniform Code of Military Justice delegating to Executive power to determine aggravating factors
warranting death penalty); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-67 (1991) (upholding provisions
of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 delegating to Attorney General
power to temporarily schedule controlled substance when "necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to
public safety"); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-24 (1989) (upholding
provisions of Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 delegating to Secretary of Transportation power to establish system of user fees to cover costs of administering certain federal pipeline
safety programs); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-97 (1989) (upholding provision of
Sentencing Reform Act delegating to Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch power to
promulgate Federal Sentencing Guidelines). Ironically, the most candid explanation of the Court's
current approach is contained in the only dissenting opinion that was written in any of those cases. See
Mistretta, 422 U.S. at 415-16 (stating "we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law") (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 373 n.7 ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited ... to giving narrow constructions to statutory
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 391, 393-403
(1987) (arguing that the Court cannot create any justiciable standard for applying nondelegation
doctrine).
28. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 2.6; Pierce, supra note 27, at 408-17.
29. The Court sometimes attempts to enforce the nondelegation doctrine through use of an alternative remedy-adoption of a narrowing construction of an ambiguous statute. See, e.g., Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). It is not at all clear that this
remedy has the effect of deterring Congress from enacting vague and ambiguous statutes. It is
reasonable to assume that a judicial decision that adopts a narrowing construction will please some
members of Congress and displease others. Moreover, this remedy has precisely the vice the Court
decried and prohibited in Chevron-it confers on politically unaccountable judges the power to make
fundamental policy decisions.
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would resolve those disputes in a manner consistent with their policy preferences. Given the institutional rivalry between Congress and the President, the
Court could predict with confidence that Congress would react to Chevron by
maximizing the number of policy decisions it makes through the legislative
process and minimizing the number of policy decisions it cedes to the President.
There is considerable evidence that Congress has understood, and acted in
response to, this message. Since 1984, Congress has enacted or amended many
statutes that delegate power to agencies. Those statutory enactments are extraordinarily long and detailed. 30 They leave to the President much less policymaking discretion than did the typical pre-Chevron statute.
In this respect, Chevron can be considered one of the first judicial applications of modem understandings of the regulatory process. Regulatory scholars
have long recognized that command and control regulation is both ineffective
and inefficient.3 1 It can, and should, be replaced with what Richard Stewart calls
"reconstitutive strategies"-methods of changing the incentives of individuals
and institutions in ways that will induce them to behave in socially constructive
ways. 32 For two centuries, the Court attempted to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine through use of command and control regulation of Congress. As has
proven to be the case in many other contexts, that effort was ineffective and
inefficient. The Chevron two-step reflects the Court's decision to adopt a
"reconstitutive strategy." By changing the incentives of Congress, the Court
finally identified a method of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine that is both
effective and efficient.
C. FINDING A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE PLACE FOR AGENCIES

Justices, Judges, and scholars have long struggled to reconcile the present
structure of government with the structure prescribed by the Constitution.3 3 The
Constitution makes no reference to agencies. Yet, hundreds of federal agencies
possess, in the aggregate, enormous power to make policy decisions that bind

30. See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential
Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 175 (1992).
31. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND
POLmCS OF CLEAN AIR 16-80 (1983); ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES,

AND PUBLIC POLICY 6-9, 120 (1975); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 549, 585-604 (1979); Richard B. Stewart,
Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 97-102 (1986).
32. Stewart, supra note 31, at 89.
33. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132-34 (1980); JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1978); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 93 (1979); Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and

Control of DelegatedPower, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisisand
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Roscoe Pound, The Future of Law, 47
YALE L. J. 1 (1937); Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separationof Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
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the public. Critics of the modem administrative state decry this structural
feature of modem government as legitimizing a "headless fourth branch" of
government.3 4 Such a structure is inconsistent with the Framers' design because
it enables "politically
unresponsive administrators" to make "fundamental
35
decisions.",
policy
Chevron responds to this persistent criticism by finding a constitutionally
permissible place for agencies within the structure devised by the Framers.
Agencies are not a "headless fourth branch," and agency decisionmakers are
not "politically unresponsive administrators." When an agency (or a court)
makes a decision that is dictated by application of Chevron step one, it is
implementing a policy decision made by Congress through use of the legislative
process. When an agency makes a policy decision that is "permissible" within
the meaning of Chevron step two, it "may... properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices .... ,,36
Thus, agencies are inferior to both of the politically accountable branches,
and all agency policy decisions are attributable to one of the two politically
accountable branches. This placement of agencies within the structure of government is entirely consistent with the Court's treatment of a variety of related
37
structural issues, including its treatment of so-called "independent" agencies.
D. CONTROLLING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

The Supreme Court's responsibilities include maintaining control over the
decentralized Judicial Branch. The Court's ability to perform that critical function has been strained by the dramatic expansion and the increasing ideological
diversity of the federal judiciary. The pre-Chevron legal regime posed a significant threat to the Court's ability to maintain a tolerable degree of control over
the Judicial Branch.3 8 Before Chevron, each of hundreds of federal judges had
substantial policymaking power. When confronted with a gap or ambiguity in
an agency-administered statute, a judge was free to "impose [his] own construction on the statute." Given the wide variety of "tools of statutory construction"
available to judges, and the resulting high degree of indeterminacy of the
34. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Industrial Union Dep 't, 448 U.S. at 686-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
37. I have explained at length in another article why the Court's opinions relevant to the independent
agency issue should be understood as conferring on the President plenary power to exercise control
over policy decisions made by an agency. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 21-41. In 1996, the Third Circuit
adopted and applied that interpretation of the Court's opinions. See Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730 (3d
Cir. 1996) (interpreting Supreme Court's opinions as conferring on the President plenary power to
remove officer who has power to make policy decisions).
38. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
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process of statutory construction, the pre-Chevron legal regime had the effect of
empowering each of hundreds of judges to make myriad policy decisions
guided primarily by each judge's own "views of wise policy."' 39 That legal
regime created two serious problems. First, it conferred vast policymaking
40
power on judges who are "not part of either political branch of government."
Second, it created a large number of intercircuit, and even intracircuit, splits
with respect to the appropriate construction of ambiguous agency-administered
statutes. Without a major doctrinal change, that legal environment threatened to
render the Court incapable of maintaining control of the Judicial Branch.4 1
By prohibiting judges from imposing their own construction on ambiguous
agency-administered statutes, Chevron rendered the Court's task far more manageable.42 Indeed, Chevron has enhanced the Court's ability to control the
Judicial Branch to such an extent that the Court is now able to perform that task
with fewer resources, thereby enabling it to devote increased time and attention
to its other critical responsibility-resolving important issues of law. Simultaneously, Chevron restricted the power of politically unaccountable judges by
withdrawing their authority to make policy decisions under the guise of adopting judicial constructions of ambiguous agency-administered statutes.
E. FURTHERING THE VALUES OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

One of the core principles of the Anglo-American system of justice is that
like cases should be decided in a like manner.43 While that principle long
is
antedated the U.S. Constitution, the Court has consistently held that it 44
Clause.
Protection
Equal
the
and
Clause
Process
Due
the
both
in
embodied
The Court also applies the principle as one of the most important constraints on
agencies' discretionary decisionmaking. An agency is held to have acted in4 an
5
arbitrary and capricious manner if it decides similar cases in dissimilar ways.
The Chevron doctrine greatly enhances the likelihood that the U.S. system of
administrative justice will yield results consistent with the fundamental principle that like cases should be decided in like manner. The reason is simple.
There is only one agency, while there are thirteen circuit courts. The pre39. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 3.6; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutionaland
PoliticalTheory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 484-89 (1985).
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
41. See Strauss, supra note 38.
42. In the context of interpretations of agency-administered statutes, splits between circuits can arise
only if at least one circuit reverses the agency's interpretation. As of 1990, Chevron had reduced the
incidence of such judicial reversals of agency interpretations by 33%. Peter H. Schuck & Donald E.
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
984, 1035.
43. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971): Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 571, 595-96 (1987).
,44. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUrlONAL LAW 1436 (2d ed. 1988).
45. See, e.g., Atchison T. & S.F.R. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973); see generally
1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 11.5.
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Chevron legal environment produced many splits among the circuits with
respect to the appropriate judicial construction of an ambiguous agencyadministered statute. In such an environment, no agency could adhere to the
principle that like cases should be decided in like manner. To the contrary,
agencies often were required to decide cases that arose in one region in a
manner different from similar cases that arose in another region.46
In the post-Chevron legal environment, disagreements among circuits with
respect to the meaning of agency-administered statutes are much less frequent. 47 Only the agency charged with responsibility to administer a statute has
the power to engage in the policymaking process inherent in adopting a
construction of an ambiguous statute. Moreover, agency violations of the
principle that like cases must be decided in like manner are relatively rare and
are easily detected and reversed by reviewing courts.48
F. ENABLING AGENCIES TO CONSTRUCT CONSISTENT AND COHERENT PROGRAMS

Congress typically assigns to an agency responsibility for constructing a
regulatory or benefit program that is consistent with a long, complicated statute.
When that statute emerges from the sausage factory that is the legislative process,
it invariably includes scores of gaps, ambiguities, and internally inconsistent
provisions. The Telecommunications Act of 199649 is illustrative. The Act is
over one hundred pages long. It amends, but does not repeal, the "hodge-podge
of overlapping and conflicting regulatory regimes" that were already in place
when the Act was passed. 50 The Act clearly resolves several important policy
issues. The Act leaves many other important issues unaddressed, however, and
it addresses other issues in vague or inconsistent ways. It is impossible to predict many of the most important characteristics of the new regulatory program
that the Act will spawn based only on an analysis of language of the Act itself.
In their excellent book analyzing the Act, Peter Huber, Michael Kellogg, and
John Thorne identify myriad gaps, ambiguities, and internal inconsistencies in
the Act. 5 ' In many cases, the construction of a single ambiguous provision of
the Act will have enormous effects on the future contours of the U.S. telecommunications industry.52 An agency's task in this typical situation is to construct a
coherent regulatory program within the boundaries created by the statutes that
limit the agency's discretion. In that process, some institution or combination of
institutions must adopt constructions of scores of ambiguous statutory provisions.

46. See Strauss, supra note 38.
47. See supra note 42.
48. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 11.5.
49. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Modem statutes creating or modifying benefit
programs share these characteristics; see, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
50. PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 4 (1996).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., id. § 1.1.7.
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Even under Chevron, courts play a critical role in this process. Courts are
assigned the task of policing the statutory boundaries to the extent that those
boundaries are clear.53 They are not permitted, however, to impose their own
constructions on ambiguous statutory provisions. Chevron assigns that task
solely to the agency, "rely[ing] upon5 4 the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments."
The Court's assignment of the task of statutory construction exclusively to
agencies is critical to their ability to construct a coherent regulatory program.
Again, the Telecommunications Act illustrates the point. The agency charged
with the responsibility of administering the Act can choose one of a dozen or
more regulatory models that are consistent with the statutory boundaries limiting its discretion. The agency's choice of one of those models over competing
models will be determinative of the constructions it adopts with respect to
scores of ambiguous statutory provisions. Thus, the agency must approach the
task of statutory construction as a complicated, integrated task in which each
construction must fit with scores of other constructions to create a coherent
regulatory program that is consistent both with the language of the Act and with
the regulatory philosophy of the incumbent administration.5 5
If reviewing courts were free to impose on an agency judicial constructions
of ambiguous statutory provisions, the results would be easy to predict and
extremely unpalatable. Assume that the incumbent administration is politically
moderate with respect to telecommunications regulatory issues. Accordingly,
the agency will choose a "moderate" model of telecommunications regulation.
The agency will adopt scores of constructions of ambiguous statutory provisions that are consistent with its politically moderate model. In the case of the
Telecommunications Act, the agency is required to issue eighty rules in the
initial process of implementing the Act. Most of those rules will include one or
more constructions of ambiguous statutory language. Each of the rules and
agency constructions will be reviewed by a court. Scores of judges in several
circuits will participate in the review process. The policy views of those judges
will span a broad spectrum from liberal to conservative. If each judge were free
to impose on the agency the judge's preferred construction of a particular
ambiguous provision of the statute, the review process inevitably would yield
"liberal" judicial constructions of some provisions and "conservative" judicial
constructions of other provisions. The result would be an incoherent legal
regime in which the agency would have no viable options.5 6 It would be
precluded from adopting any coherent model of telecommunications regulation.
53. See, e.g., Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1996) (staying FCC rule based on
determination that rule probably violates statute).
54. Chevron,467 U.S. at 865.
55. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony andIncoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 763 -76 (1995).
56. See id. at 763-76; see also Pierce, supra note 11, at 1252-54; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility
Regulatory Takings: Should the JudiciaryAttempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEo. L.J.
2031, 2036-39 (1989).
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Thus, the Chevron doctrine furthers simultaneously a long list of social
values that span a broad spectrum from constitutional and political theory to
prosaic details of the process of governing a complicated nation. It also provides
a coherent constitutional framework within which other issues of law and policy
can be evaluated and debated. It follows that the Chevron doctrine is entitled to
great respect by courts. What should a court do, however, if it perceives a
conflict between Chevron and another doctrine that is entitled to the respect of
courts-stare decisis? To explore that question, I will begin by describing stare
decisis and the values it furthers.
II. THE

VALUES FURTHERED BY STARE DECISIS

Stare decisis refers to the common practice of adhering to precedent even
when the precedent is, or may be, wrong in some sense. No institution adheres
to precedent in all circumstances. For example, any institution will overrule a
precedent when it concludes that the precedent is manifestly wrong or when it
concludes that the precedent is producing significant adverse effects. 57 Both
courts and agencies rely on some version of stare decisis, but agencies generally
are more willing to depart from precedent than are courts.
The process of determining whether a case is governed by a precedent often
requires an institution to engage in an exercise in characterization. The institution
must first abstract from the precedent decision a rule for which the precedent stands,
and then determine whether that rule dictates the outcome of the pending case. 8
Careful analysis and characterization of a precedent often can avoid the need to
choose between overruling a precedent and reaching an appropriate result in a case.
Support for stare decisis has always been controversial. Courts rarely address
the issue, and scholars are divided with respect to the legitimacy of the practice
and the circumstances in which an institution should overrule a precedent. Some
scholars view stare decisis as an indefensible and unconstitutional practice. 59
Others view it as indispensable. 6 ° Scholars have attempted to explain and to
support the practice on many grounds, each of which varies in persuasive power
depending on the context in which the issue arises. Among these grounds are:
(1) conserving scarce institutional resources; (2) encouraging decisionmakers to
exercise foresight in announcing new rules; (3) protecting institutional reputation; (4) reducing variations among decisionmakers; (5) enhancing intertemporal equity; and (6) protecting reliance interests. This Part discusses these
grounds and their applicability in the context of administrative lawmaking.
57. See Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Monaghan, supra
note 33, at 756-62.
58. See Schauer, supra note 43.
59. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HAV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 23 (1994).
60. See generally Monaghan, supra note 33 (arguing that stare decisis is a means of maintaining
political stability and continuity); Schauer, supra note 43 at 595-602 (arguing that stare decisis
promotes fairness, predictability, and strengthened decisionmaking).
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A. CONSERVATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES

Stare decisis is justifiable in part as a means of conserving scarce institutional
resources. 6 ' Formulating rules is a difficult and time-consuming process. No
institution has the luxury of addressing every issue as if it were res nova in
every case in which the issue arises. This justification alone may be sufficient to
support the practice of stare decisis in the vast majority of cases in which it is
employed. It is inadequate to support the practice in any interesting case,
however. I use the term "interesting case" to refer to a case in which an
institution has good reason to believe that the applicable precedent is wrong in
some sense or is producing destructive effects. In such cases, the institution's
skepticism with respect to the wisdom of retaining the precedent surely justifies
some commitment of scarce institutional resources to the process of reconsideration of the precedent, even if the institution decides to retain the precedent for
reasons independent of its desire to conserve its scarce resources. Of course,
this reasoning applies to all institutions that adhere to the practice of stare
decisis-the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and agencies. Every institution
should be willing to devote resources to the process of reconsidering a precedent when it has reason to believe that it is wrong and/or destructive in its
effects.
B. INDUCING FORESIGHT IN DECISIONMAKING

The practice of adhering to precedent encourages decisionmakers to exercise
foresight when they announce a new rule in the process of deciding a case.62
Decisionmakers must attempt to anticipate the range of future cases to which a
rule will apply. Further, they must predict the consequences of future applications of the rule in the process of deciding whether to announce a new rule as
the basis for deciding a case as well as in choosing the rule to announce.
There is a troubling circularity to this justification for stare decisis, however.
In a legal environment that includes a strong version of stare decisis, it is
undoubtedly important to induce decisionmakers to exercise foresight in the
process of deciding a case. Conversely, decisionmakers can perform their
functions responsibly without any use of foresight in a legal environment with
no stare decisis doctrine, and can responsibly devote less time and effort to the
process of attempting to predict 'the future consequences of announcing a
decisional rule in an environment with a weak form of stare decisis. 63 Thus, the
need to exercise foresight in crafting decisional rules inevitably depends on the
existence of other justifications for stare decisis.
Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult for a decisionmaker to anticipate all of
61. See Monaghan, supra note 33, at 744-46 (describing agenda-limiting function of stare decisis);
Schauer, supra note 43, at 599 (noting that a system of precedent conserves decisional resources).
62. See Schauer, supra note 43, at 572-75.
63. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 153-55 (1930) (arguing that judges become
distracted from doing justice when they become overly concerned with the precedential effects of their
rulings).
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the future situations to which a rule will apply and to predict with tolerable
accuracy the consequences of each of those potential future applications of a
decisional rule. Agencies have powerful comparative advantages over courts in
this respect. Judges typically have little knowledge of the complicated regulatory and benefit programs that agencies administer. Moreover, they typically
have little understanding of the disciplines relevant to predicting the consequences of announcing alternative decisional rules applicable to disputes that
arise in the process of administering those programs. Such disciplines span a
broad spectrum that includes economics, engineering, chemistry, physics, toxicology, meteorology, and medicine. Judges also lack access to decisionmaking
procedures through which they can educate themselves with respect to either
those disciplines or the many characteristics of a regulatory or benefit program
that can cause a decisional rule to have unintended adverse consequences. Even
if they had access to procedures appropriate for that purpose, judges lack the
time necessary to obtain such an education. Thus, it would be a mistake to
assume that courts can perform the difficult task of predicting the future
consequences of a judicially crafted decisional rule applicable to a regulatory or
benefit program with tolerable accuracy.
An agency charged with responsibility to administer a regulatory or benefit
program has obvious comparative advantages over a court with respect to its
understanding of both the characteristics of the program and the disciplines
relevant to the program. Agencies have two other advantages over courts that
are even more important for this purpose. First, agencies have access to a
decisionmaking procedure-notice and comment rulemaking-that is vastly
superior to judicial decisionmaking procedures for the purpose of predicting the
future consequences of alternative decisional rules. 64 Second, agencies can
devote much more time and many more resources to that difficult prediction
process than can a court. Typically, a court can allocate no more than a few days
of highly skilled legal talent to the task. By contrast, when an agency uses
notice and comment rulemaking to shape and announce a new decisional rule, it
typically devotes tens of thousands of person hours to the task of predicting the
future consequences of alternative decisional rules.6 5 Moreover, the agency's
decisionmaking team invariably includes individuals with expertise in each of
the fields relevant to the difficult predictive process.
Thus, the Chevron doctrine actually furthers this value better than the practice
of stare decisis. Because courts have extremely limited ability to predict the
consequences of a decisional rule announced in the context of an agencyadministered regulatory or benefit system, they should assume a minimalist role
in that process; i.e., they should adhere to Chevron and announce such a rule
only when the language of a statute requires them to do so. Courts also should

64. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59,
59-60 (1995).
65. Id. at 60-62.

2240

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:2225

adopt rules and practices that recognize that agencies have significant comparative advantages over courts in predicting the effects of alternative decisional
rules applicable to agency-administered regulatory and benefit systems. Two
corollaries logically follow from these principles. First, a court should be
particularly receptive to an agency argument that a rule previously announced
by a court is wrong and/or is having unintended adverse effects. Second, a court
should be particularly reluctant to reverse a decisional rule adopted by an agency.
C. PROTECTING INSTITUTIONAL REPUTATION

An institution that changes its decisional rules with frequency is likely to
experience a diminution of its reputation.6 6 It is also likely to induce cynicism
among those who become aware of that institutional characteristic. This reality
provides a potentially powerful justification for stare decisis. Its justificatory
power varies, however, with several factors.
First, its strength varies depending on the nature of the institution and the
source of the decisional rule. A court that announces rules of law risks significant reputational harm if it overrules precedents with considerable frequency.
Those who are aware of that characteristic of the institution will begin to
perceive it as a political institution rather than a judicial institution, and they
will begin to perceive law as simply a part of the political process.67 An agency
that announces decisional rules predicated on policy analysis is exposed to
lower risks of reputational harm as a result of frequent changes in its decisional
rules. The policymaking process should be dynamic. It should produce relatively frequent changes in decisional rules attributable both to changes in our
understanding of fields such as economics, engineering, toxicology and medicine, and to changes in the policy preferences of the electorate, as those changes
are reflected in the results of presidential and congressional elections. 68 Moreover, agencies are, and should be, political institutions, as the court recognized
in Chevron.69 They make policy. They need not be, and should not pretend to
be, judicial institutions.
Second, the strength of the reputational justification varies depending on the
institution's ability to provide persuasive reasons in support of a decision to
change a decisional rule. This variable applies to some extent to all institutions
and to all decisional rules. A well-reasoned judicial decision overruling a

66. See Monaghan, supra note 33, at 752-54.
67. See id.
68. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that a change in political party of
the Administration is a valid reason for National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to change its
regulatory policies regarding automatic automobile crash protection technology); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-08 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (discussing authority of, and necessity for, the President to control and supervise administrative
agencies).
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precedent often elicits widespread praise rather than criticism or cynicism. The
strength of this justification also varies to some extent, however, depending on
the nature of the institution and the source of the rule. Typically, it is easier for
an agency to provide a persuasive explanation for changing a policy-based
decisional rule than it is for a court to provide a persuasive explanation for
changing a rule of law.
Third, the strength of the reputational justification depends in part on the
characteristics of the relevant audience. In some contexts, this variable can be
very important. Henry Monaghan draws a useful distinction between the "elites,"
who study an institution's decisions with care, and the general public. 7 ° In most
contexts, the only relevant audience consists of the relatively few elites, but in
some cases the relevant audience includes the general public.
Roe v. Wade7 1 provides a good example of the potential significance of this
distinction. Many elites who study the Supreme Court's opinions with care
believe that the rule announced in Roe is manifestly wrong as a matter of
constitutional law, independent of their views with respect to abortion. 72 Many
elites would applaud a well-reasoned opinion that overruled Roe. In the context
of a case like Roe, however, elites are neither the only relevant audience nor the
most important audience for purposes of predicting the reputational effects of an
overruling.
A majority of the general public supports the rule announced in Roe. They
have never read the opinion. They know nothing about the Court's reasoning in
support of the rule or about its fragile constitutional underpinnings. If the Court
were to overrule Roe, it would be highly unlikely that the general public would
read that opinion or understand the reasoning in support of such a change in a
rule of constitutional law.
As a result, even a well-reasoned opinion reversing Roe would be likely to
create severe harm to the Court's reputation with a majority of the general
public and to induce increased public cynicism about the law and the role of the
courts. The potential for such a socially costly public reaction is enhanced by
the widespread public perception that several members of the present Court
were nominated because of their willingness to overrule Roe. Thus, the reputational injury justification for adhering to precedent is powerful. The Court
referred to this factor in the process of reaffirming Roe under circumstances in
which a majority of Justices appeared to believe that Roe's rule is wrong.73
Very few precedents are remotely comparable to Roe in this respect. More
70. See Monaghan, supra note 33, at 749-53 (suggesting legitimation to elites as primary goal of
rule of law theories about Supreme Court).
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 285-311 (1973).
73. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-69 (1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 518-19 (1989).
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typically, an institution's decision to overrule a precedent is known only to the
elites who study the institution's decisions. In that situation, the elites comprise
the only audience relevant to predicting the degree of reputational injury the
institution will suffer as a result of overruling a precedent. In that common
situation, the institution may avoid any injury to its reputation attributable to a
decision to overrule a precedent if it provides a good explanation for that decision. Indeed, such a decision is likely to enhance the reputation of the institution.
This factor also demonstrates the close relationship between the merits of a
decision to overrule a precedent and the reputational harm attributable to such a
decision. If an institution is not capable of providing a good reason for a
decision overruling a precedent, it should not make such a decision, both
because it lacks a sufficient meritocratic justification for doing so and because it
is likely to suffer reputational harm as a result of issuing such a decision.
Conversely, an institution should overrule a mistaken precedent if it can provide
a good reason for that action, unless the "audience" that is aware of the
precedent is broader than the elites who study the institution's decisions or the
institution has reasons for adhering to the precedent that are independent of its
desire to avoid injury to its reputation.
The value of preserving an institution's reputation is furthered both by stare
decisis and by Chevron. It is furthered directly by stare decisis because that
practice reduces the number of occasions when an institution changes a decisional rule. It is also furthered indirectly by Chevron because Chevron reduces
the number of future occasions when a court must make the difficult choice
between adhering to a decisional rule it now regrets having announced or
acquiescing to an agency's well-reasoned argument in support of an alternative
decisional rule.
The value of reputational interests also varies with the institution whose
reputation is at stake. In this context, a good argument can be made to support a
hierarchy in which we place the highest value on the reputation of the Supreme
Court, because it is the most salient symbol of the rule of law in our society, and
the lowest value on the reputation of agencies, both because they have less
symbolic value and because we expect agencies to change their decisional rules
more often than courts change rules of law. Any institution, including the
Supreme Court, can overrule most decisional rules with no adverse effect on its
reputation, however, if it provides good reasons for its action.
D. REDUCING VARIATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKERS

The individual decisionmakers within an institution change over time. A
strong tradition of stare decisis dampens the variation in institutional decisionmaking that otherwise would result from those changes in the individual
composition of the institution. Some scholars view this effect as an independent
justification for the practice.7 4
74. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 43, at 600.
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It is hard to identify any social value that is furthered by this effect of
stare decisis, however, that is independent of the values furthered by other
justifications. This effect is advantageous if it adds credence to the incantation
that ours is a nation of laws rather than men. But, that is just another way of
describing the reputational harm justification for stare decisis. 75 The variation
dampening effect of stare decisis also has the advantage of enhancing intertemporal equity, but that is a justification that merits independent consideration. Of
course, if reducing variations among individual decisionmakers is an independent
value that is furthered by stare decisis, it would seem to be furthered equally by
stare decisis at each of the three levels: the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and
agencies.
E. ENHANCING INTERTEMPORAL EQUITY

Stare decisis enhances longitudinal, or intertemporal, equity. It creates a legal
environment in which like cases produce like results independent of the time
when the dispute arises or the conduct takes place.7 6 This is certainly a positive
attribute of the practice, ceteris paribus. It is not a particularly persuasive reason
for adhering to precedent in any interesting case, however. Interesting cases
involve institutional decisions that continue to apply a rule that the institution
now believes to be wrong in some important sense. It is hard to justify
intentionally applying the "wrong" rule to all future cases simply because an
institution unintentionally applied that "wrong" rule in all past cases.7 7 Any
institution must be free to correct its own errors.
The case in support of horizontal, or intratemporal, equity is much more
powerful than the case in support of intertemporal equity. It is hard to conceive
of any meritocratic justification for applying different outcome-determinative
decisional rules to like cases that are decided during the same time period. A
legal system can produce results of that type only through one of two mechanisms: intentional, irrational discrimination attributable to inappropriate institutional motives, or unintentional, irrational discrimination attributable to flaws in
the institutional structure of the legal system. The U.S. legal system includes
many judicially enforced doctrines that are designed to detect, deter, or punish
instances of intentional irrational discrimination. It also should choose doctrines
that are likely to minimize unintentional, irrational discrimination. Although
Chevron serves this purpose,78 stare decisis does not. Indeed, in one important
context, stare decisis interferes with this goal: When a circuit court chooses to
adhere to a circuit precedent instead of deferring to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, it risks creating a legal environment characterized by unintentional, irrational discrimination.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See supra Part lc.
See Schauer, supra note 43, at 595-98.
See Alexander, supra note 57, at 9-13.
See supra Part IE.
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F. PROTECTION OF RELIANCE INTERESTS

In some important contexts, a rule announced in a precedent induces significant, irrevocable actions taken in reliance on the assumption that the rule is
valid and will remain in effect.79 In such circumstances, overruling a precedent
can have extraordinarily destructive effects. The Legal Tender Cases8° provide a
good illustration of this sometimes powerful justification for stare decisis.
Scholars generally agree that the Court's decisions authorizing the government
to substitute paper money for metal money, were clearly wrong as a matter of
constitutional law.8 1 Yet, it is unimaginable that the Court would overrule those
precedents. The entire U.S. economy has been constructed on the premise that
paper money is legal tender. The Court would be behaving in an extraordinarily
irresponsible manner if it overruled a precedent in circumstances in which its
decision destroyed trillions of dollars of investments made in reliance on that
precedent.
The strength of the detrimental reliance justification for stare decisis varies
with the context in which the precedent decision is issued. All rules of law
probably induce some detrimental reliance. The nature and magnitude of the
reliance interest varies over a wide spectrum, however. Moreover, an institution
often can devise means of protecting reliance interests when it overrules a
precedent. The Supreme Court's frequent practice of giving only prospective
effect to its holdings with respect to new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure is illustrative in this regard.8 2
Agency precedents can also give rise to significant reliance interests. Individuals and institutions often act in reliance on the assumption that an agency
decision announcing a rule of law or a construction of a statute will remain
viable in the future. Agency or judicial decisions overruling or reversing such an
agency precedent can yield significant harm to reliance interests. There is a
major difference, however, between the effects of an agency decision that
overrules an agency precedent and the effects of a judicial decision that overrules or reverses an agency precedent. Agencies usually provide means of
protecting reliance interests when they overrule an agency precedent that gave
rise to such interests.83 If an agency fails to do so, its decision to overrule the

79. See Alexander,supra note 57, at 13-14; Monaghan, supra note 33, at 744-46.
80. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 367, 367 n.l.
81. Id. at 389.
82. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 297 (1967) (announcing three criteria for determining
whether new rules of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively).
31,036 (1996), is illustrative. The agency
83. Order No. 888, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. (CCH)
requires electric utilities to provide "open access" to their transmission lines. That new requirement
exposes utilities for the first time to the risk that competitive market forces will preclude them from
recovering over one hundred billion dollars of their investments in generating plants. The agency
recognizes, however, that those investments were made in reliance on the prior methods of regulating
electric utilities. To avoid the arguable unfairness that otherwise would result from its major change in
regulatory rules, the agency states that utilities will be allowed to recover their stranded investments
through use of an agency-authorized surcharge.
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precedent is highly vulnerable to rejection by a reviewing court as arbitrary and
capricious. 84 By contrast, a judicial decision reversing or overruling an agency
precedent usually has the effect of destroying completely the value of all
investments made in reliance on the agency precedent. A court can protect
reliance interests when it overrules a precedent, as many of the Supreme Court's
constitutional criminal procedure decisions illustrate. In most contexts, however, including judicial decisions to reverse or overrule agency precedents,
courts rarely take any action to protect the reliance interests that have been
created by the precedent.
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund85 demonstrates this effect. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued a rule in 1980 in which it interpreted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to exempt from regulation ash generated by
municipal incinerators that bum household waste. 86 Over the ensuing fourteen
years, municipalities invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 150 incinerators
in reliance on their expectation that the agency rule would remain viable.87
When the Supreme Court reversed the EPA rule in 1994, it placed that entire
investment in jeopardy.
The effects of the reversal of the RCRA rule also illustrate another important
point. A decision to overrule or to reverse a long-standing precedent usually
causes much greater harm to reliance interests than does a decision to overrule
or to reverse a recently announced rule. If a court had reversed the EPA's
incinerator ash rule in 1982, instead of in 1994, its decision would have caused
little, if any, harm to reliance interests. This and many other cases show the
strong relationship between the age of a precedent and the magnitude of the
injury to reliance interests caused by a decision to overrule, or to reverse, that
precedent. 88

84. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S.Ct. 1730, 1734 (1996) ("change that does not
take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation ... may be 'arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse
of discretion' .... " (citations omitted)); see, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that agency could not impose fine based on one plausible interpretation of rule because
firm had relied on another plausible interpretation); Association of Gas Dist. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981,
1028-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that agency did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking when it
made major change in regulatory rules that had effect of exposing regulatees to risk of loss of billions
of dollars in contractual commitments made in reliance on prior regulatory rules without adequately
discussing potential means of allowing regulatees to mitigate damage to their reliance interests); Retail,
Wholesale and Dep't. Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reversing agency's
retroactive application of new policy on basis that regulatee had relied to its detriment on prior policy);
see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory
Contract, 71 N.YU. L. REv., 851 (1996) (arguing that agencies are constitutionally required to provide
compensation for reliance interests when they change policies).
85. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
86. Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed.
Reg. 33,084, 33,120 (1980).
87. City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 347-48 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversing an EPA rule that had shaped
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In some contexts, individuals and institutions begin to take significant actions
in reliance on the continued viability of a rule shortly after the rule is announced. In such circumstances, the judiciary has only a brief window of
opportunity in which it can reverse the agency rule without doing significant
damage to reliance interests. A rule issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in 1992 illustrates this phenomenon. 89 The rule required all natural
gas pipelines to "unbundle" their functions, i.e., to sell separately gas, transportation services, and storage services. By the time a court issued a decision with
respect to the validity of that rule in 1996, every pipeline had completely
restructured its operations, terminated or amended thousands of pre-existing
contracts, and entered into thousands of new contracts in reliance on the
continuing validity of the rule. Fortunately, the court upheld the basic elements
of the rule. 90 A decision reversing the rule four years after it was issued would
have produced hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to reliance interests.
Detrimental reliance on a rule or precedent also comes into play when
Congress relies on the continuing vitality of a judicial or agency precedent. A
Veterans Administration (VA) precedent interpreting the World War Veterans'
Act 91 provides such an example. In 1930, the VA interpreted the Act to
authorize compensation only for injuries attributable to negligent treatment at
VA hospitals and not for injuries attributable to nonnegligent treatment.92 Over
the next sixty years, Congress took numerous actions in reliance on the assumption that the agency precedent would remain viable. Congress reenacted the Act
without changing the language that had formed the basis for the agency
interpretation. It also made numerous budgetary decisions based on the implicit
assumption that the rule announced in the agency precedent had continuing
vitality. In 1994, the Court reversed that long-standing agency precedent. 93 Its
decision was one of four Supreme Court opinions issued in 1994 alone that
reversed long-standing agency precedents on which Congress had relied to its
detriment.9 4
the conduct of both the agency and its regulatees for over a decade even though the agency had used the
rule as the foundation on which it had built its entire complicated system of regulating toxic wastes).
89. Order No. 636, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 30,939 (1992).
90. See United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Many agency rules begin to
create substantial reliance interests within about two years. This aspect of reality has three functional
implications in addition to its implications for resolving conflicts between Chevron and stare decisis.
First, pre-enforcement review of rules often yields benefits for both agencies and regulatees, as the
Court predicted in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154-55 (1967). Second, strict
statutory time limits on the availability of judicial review of regulatory rules often have powerful
socially-beneficial effects. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. U.S., 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (upholding time limit
on availability of judicial review of emissions rules). Third, courts should expedite the process of
reviewing agency rules.
91. Pub. L. No. 105-4, 43 Stat. 607 (1924).
92. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994).
93. Id. at 117-22.
94. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267,
280-81 (1994) (reversing Department of Labor's "true doubt" rule); City of Chicago v. Environmental
Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 333-39 (1994) (reversing EPA rule interpreting RCRA to exempt from
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To summarize my treatment of the values underlying stare decisis, two of
these values-conserving judicial resources and reducing variations among
individual decisionmakers-justify only a weak form of stare decisis. They are
insufficient to support a decision to decline to reconsider a precedent when an
institution has reason to believe that the precedent is, or may be, wrong and/or
destructive in its effects. Moreover, these values are furthered equally by
adherence to the practice at all levels: the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and
agencies.
Similarly, although stare decisis furthers the value of enhancing intertemporal
equity, that value can support only a weak version of stare decisis, and it
provides no basis to distinguish among the institutions that follow the practice.
Enhancing intratemporal equity is an important social value, but that value is
furthered by Chevron rather than by stare decisis. Moreover, in the context of
circuit court review of agency actions, stare decisis interferes with pursuit of the
value of intratemporal equity. A circuit court that adheres to circuit precedent
rather than according an agency Chevron deference risks creating a legal
environment in which similar cases yield disparate results.
Stare decisis can further the important value of inducing decisionmakers to
use foresight in announcing decisional rules. Agencies have enormous advantages over courts, however, in the process of crafting decisional rules that are
likely to yield socially desirable results in the context of agency-administered
regulatory or benefit programs. Thus, Chevron furthers this value more effectively than stare decisis, and stare decisis at the agency level furthers this value
to a greater extent than does stare decisis at the judicial level.
Stare decisis also furthers the important value of protecting reliance interests.
Chevron also furthers this value, however, and administrative stare decisis
protects reliance interests more effectively than judicial stare decisis. Indeed,
courts often destroy important reliance interests when they reverse agency
decisional rules, particularly rules that have existed for many years. By contrast,
agencies invariably consider, and usually protect, reliance interests when they
overrule their own precedents.
Finally, stare decisis furthers the important value of protecting an institution's
reputation. This is the only value of stare decisis that clearly favors judicial
stare decisis over administrative stare decisis. A court that engages in frequent
changes in the rules it applies risks serious injury to its reputation. The Supreme
Court's reputation is uniquely valuable to society. Thus, stare decisis is uniquely
valuable in Supreme Court decisionmaking. Yet, any institution, including the
Supreme Court, can preserve, or even enhance, its reputation while departing
from precedent, as long as it does so only in circumstances in which it provides

regulation ash generated by municipal incinerators that burn household waste); Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171-91 (1994) (reversing agency precedent that private plaintiffs
could maintain "aiding and abetting" actions under Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)); see also Pierce,
supra note 55, at 754-62.
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reasons for its action that are considered persuasive by the relevant audience. In
the vast majority of cases, the relevant audience consists only of the elites who
study the institution's decisions.
III.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHEVRON AND STARE

DECISIS

Conflicts can arise between Chevron and stare decisis in at least five contexts:
(1) conflicts between Supreme Court precedents and Chevron step two; (2)
conflicts between agency precedents and Chevron step one; (3) conflicts between circuit court precedents and Chevron step one; (4) conflicts between
agency precedents and Chevron step two; and (5) conflicts between circuit court
precedents and Chevron step two. Courts have taken disparate approaches to
resolving conflicts between Chevron and stare decisis depending on the context
in which the conflict arises.
A. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS AND CHEVRON STEP TWO

The Court has issued four opinions in which it has resolved conflicts between
the deference Chevron requires to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute and rules announced in the Court's own pre-Chevron decisions adopting
judicial constructions of those statutes. 95 In this context, the Court has consistently held that stare decisis trumps Chevron. A passage from the majority
opinion in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 96 a post-Chevron
decision, provides an accurate description of the Court's approach to such
conflicts:
While it is true that the rule of [Lodge 76, InternationalAss'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n 97 ] ...is not set forth in the

specific text.., of the NLRA, that might well also be said with respect to any
number of rights or obligations that we have found implicit in a statute's
language. A rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague,
ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule
that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.
The Court adopted the "Machinists rule" as a construction of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1976.98 The rule created a "free zone from
which all regulation, 'whether federal or state,' is excluded." 99 As the Court
acknowledged in Golden State Transit, the Machinists rule is inconsistent with
the Chevron doctrine. It is one of many illustrations of the Court's pre-Chevron
95. Prior to Chevron, the Court frequently made policy decisions by adopting constructions of
ambiguous, agency-administered statutes. See supra cases cited in note 10.
96. 493 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1989).
97. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
98. Id. at 153.
99. Golden State Transit,493 U.S. at 111 (citation omitted).
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practice of imposing its own construction on an ambiguous agency-administered statute-a practice the Court held to be inappropriate and illegitimate in
Chevron. Nevertheless, the Court in Golden State Transit adopted this preChevron judicial construction of the NLRA over the interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
One of the other cases involving this type of conflict also arose under the
NLRA. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,' ° the Court reviewed an order issued by the
NLRB in which the agency concluded that an employer had committed an
unfair labor practice by barring union organizers from distributing handbills in
the employer's parking lot. The Court reversed the agency order as inconsistent
with the rule the Court had announced in 1956 in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co. 0 ' The Court repeated its prior explanation of the relationship between
Chevron and pre-Chevron Supreme Court precedents: "Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge the agency's later interpretation
of the
02
statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning."
The Court's characterization of its decision in Babcock & Wilcox as a
determination of the "clear meaning" of the NLRA is, however, misleading. In
Babcock & Wilcox, the Court "interpreted" the statutory term "unfair labor
practice" to authorize an employer to prohibit nonemployees from distributing
union literature on the employer's property if the union has access to other
reasonable means of communicating with employees. 0 3 The rule announced in
Babcock & Wilcox may be good public policy, but it is also a classic example of
the Court's pre-Chevron practice of doing that which it held to be impermissible
in Chevron-imposing its own construction on an ambiguous agency-administered statute.
The third Supreme Court decision holding that Supreme Court precedents
trump Chevron arose in the context of the Interstate Commerce Commission's
(ICC) efforts to oversee the transition from pervasive government regulation of
trucking to deregulation of trucking.' °4 Congress deregulated the trucking
industry by enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA of 1980).'05 That Act
rendered it impossible for the ICC to continue to regulate trucking by authorizing each trucking company to set its own rates and by eliminating regulatory
barriers to entry into the trucking industry. 10 6 As usual, however, Congress left
intact most of the provisions of predecessor statutes such as the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA) and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (MCA of

100. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
101. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
102. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497
U.S. 116, 131 (1990)).
103. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112-13.
104. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
105. Pub L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980).
106. See Pierce, supra note 55, at 771-76.
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1935), even though those statutes were inherently inconsistent with the competitive trucking market created by the MCA of 1980.'07
The ICC discovered that some unscrupulous trucking companies were relying
on a 1915 Supreme Court precedent to support the legality of a patently
fraudulent practice. 108 A trucking company would enter into a contract with a
shipper to ship specific goods at a specific negotiated rate, commit to file the
contract with the ICC, ship the goods but not file the contract, and then sue the
shipper years later for the difference between the rate agreed to in the contract
and the much higher rate the trucking company had on file with the ICC.
Trucking companies claimed to be entitled to twenty-seven billion dollars in
excess freight charges through use of this fraudulent practice.' 0 9 The ICC issued
a rule in which it prohibited the practice as "unreasonable" within the meaning
of the ICA." 0
Six circuit courts upheld the ICC rule,"' but the Supreme Court reversed the
rule in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc. on the basis of 1its
12
alleged inconsistency with the rule announced in the Court's 1915 precedent.'
The Court held that stare decisis .trumps Chevron even when: (1) the rule
announced in the precedent decision was predicated on policy considerations
that have no application to the dispute before the Court; (2) that rule had
become an anachronism in the wake of the enactment of the MCA of 1980; (3)
the precedent was easily distinguishable; and (4) application of the precedent
had the effect of legitimating a multi-billion dollar fraud."l 3 The Court has had
to decide three more cases in this area in an effort to reduce the damage
produced by its unfortunate decision in Maislin.114
By the time the Court decided the fourth case that raised the conflict issue,
the Court stated the relationship between its precedents and Chevron in the form

107. See id. at 766-76.
108. The Court announced the "filed rate doctrine" in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94
(1915). The ICC had concluded that it could not enforce the statutory prohibition on unduly discriminatory rail rates unless it could compel a shipper or passenger to pay the rate filed with the ICC
notwithstanding the existence of a secret, then-unlawful rebate agreement between the shipper or
passenger and the railroad. In Louisville & N.R.R., the Court agreed with the judgement of the ICC. Id.
at 99-100. Thus, the doctrine originated as a judicially-approved, agency-requested, aid to the agency's
enforcement of the system of pervasive rate regulation created by the ICA of 1887.
109. See Pierce, supra note 55, at 166-76.
110. See Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 121-22.
111. See id. at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Delta Traffic Serv. v. Transtop, Inc., 902 F.2d 101, 108
(1st Cir. 1990); Delta Traffic Serv. v. Appco Paper & Plastics Corp., 893 F.2d 472, 474-75 (2d Cir.
1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 899 E2d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1990); West Coast
Truck Lines v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 1990); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d 400, 404-05 (8th Cir. 1989); Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d
635, 639 (lth Cir. 1986).
112. Chevron, 497 U.S. at 131.
113. Pierce, supra note 55, at 166-76; see supra note 108.
114. See generally ICC v. Transcon Lines, 115 S. Ct. 689 (1995); Security Serv., Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 511 U.S. 431 (1994); Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993); see also Pierce, supra note 55, at
774-76.
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of a simple, mandatory rule. In Neal v. United States," 5 the Court referred to
the deference due to an agency's statutory construction under Chevron, but it
disposed of the conflict between Chevron and its precedent with a single,
sentence: "In any event,
principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to our
16
earlier decision." 1
Circuit courts have complied with the Supreme Court's instructions with
respect to resolution of conflicts between Supreme Court precedents and Chev-7
ron, sometimes with interesting results. In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich,'
for instance, the D.C. Circuit held an Executive Order invalid on the basis that1 it8
conflicted with a 1938 Supreme Court precedent that "interpreted" the NLRA.
Like a large proportion of such pre-Chevron "interpretations" of the NLRA, the
rule announced in the 1938 precedent would have constituted an impermissible
judicial "imposition of its own construction of an [ambiguous agencyadministered] statute" within the meaning of Chevron if the issue had first
arisen after Chevron." 9 In another case, United States v. O'Hagan,120 the
Eighth Circuit held that a SEC rule issued in 1970 was invalid because it was
inconsistent with the "model created by" two Supreme Court precedents, even
though the rule is consistent with the language of the statute. 12 ' Thus, in this
context, the Supreme Court has created a simple, mechanical rule, strictly
adhered to by the lower courts, that its own precedents must prevail over
Chevron's command.
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIRCUIT COURT AGENCY PRECEDENTS AND CHEVRON STEP
ONE

The Court has repeatedly held that the requirement of Chevron step one
trumps agency precedents, including agency precedents that have long been
regarded as settled law. In 1994 alone, the Court held that the "plain meaning"
of the language of four statutes required it to invalidate long-standing agency
precedents.12 2 The agency precedents the Court rejected through application of
124
12 3
Chevron step one during 1994 had existed for sixty years, forty-eight years,
thirty-one years,1 2 5 and fourteen years,126 respectively. In at least three of those
115. 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).
116. Id. at 766.
117. 74 F.3d 1322, affid, 83 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 1330-32.
119. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). The D.C. Circuit recognized
that characteristic of the Supreme Court precedent. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1330.
120. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd,65 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S. Jun. 25, 1997).
121. Id. at 625.
122. See generally Brown v. Gardner, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
123. See Brown, 115 S. Ct. at 556.
124. See Greenwich Collieries,512 U.S. at 284.
125. See Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 192.

126. See EnvironmentalDefense Fund,511 U.S. at 332.
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cases, the agency precedents had given rise to significant reliance interests. 127 In
all four cases, the Court seemed to attach no significance to the existence of the
long-standing agency precedents. In three of the four cases, the Court's characterof the statute as "clear," rather than ambiguous, was
ization of the language
128
highly debatable.

C. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENTS AND CHEVRON STEP ONE

The Court seems to treat circuit court precedents as equivalent to agency
precedents when it resolves conflicts between circuit court precedents and
Chevron step one. The Court attaches no apparent significance to the existence
of contrary circuit court precedents, including long-standing precedents, when it
concludes that such precedents are inconsistent with the "plain meaning" of129a
statute. Thus, for instance, in Central Bank of Denver v. First InterstateBank,
the Court held that the plain meaning of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act does not encompass aiding and abetting the commission of a
securities fraud even though every circuit had issued a decision adopting a
contrary interpretation of the1 30statute during the twenty-five year period that
preceded the Court's decision.

D. CONFLICTS BETWEEN AGENCY PRECEDENTS AND CHEVRON STEP TWO

The Court consistently applies Chevron step two as the basis to uphold an
agency's construction of a statute that is inconsistent with agency precedents.
The unanimous opinion in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. 131 explains
the basis for this method of resolving disputes between agency stare decisis and
Chevron: "change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to
leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency." 1 3 2 Thus, given the rationales underlying Chevron, this practice is
not surprising.
The Supreme Court does attach some significance to the existence of contrary
agency precedents, however. An agency must provide a reasoned basis for its
changed construction of an ambiguous statute in order to avoid a judicial
characterization of its construction as arbitrary and capricious. 133 Of course, this
qualification is also entirely consistent with step two of Chevron, since a court is
required to uphold only "permissible" or "reasonable" agency constructions of
127. See supra Part 11F.
128. See Pierce, supra note 55, at 754-62. The Court had a sound textual basis for its holding in
Brown v. Gardner.
129. 511 U.S. 164.
130. See id. at 192 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 286-95
(Souter, J., dissenting) (reversing fifty-year-old circuit court precedent).
131. 116S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
132. Id. at 1734.
133. Id. at 1734-36; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983) (holding National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
revoking certain crash protection requirements for new motor vehicles).
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statutes.' 34 An agency construction that is not adopted through a process of
reasoned decisionmaking does not qualify as a "reasonable" construction. That
process of reasoned decisionmaking must include explicit consideration of the
reliance interest created by the agency precedent. In the context of an agency
decision overturning the agency's own precedent, the Supreme Court has
therefore engaged in a straightforward application of Chevron step two in which
it integrates with care the values furthered by Chevron and the values furthered
by stare decisis.
E. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIRCUIT PRECEDENT AND CHEVRON STEP TWO

The Supreme Court has not had occasion to address the relationship between
circuit court precedents and Chevron step two. The circuits that have considered
the issue have split on what rule to adopt. Some circuit court opinions interpret
the Court's opinions that resolve conflicts between Supreme Court precedents
and Chevron step two as controlling the resolution of conflicts between circuit
court precedents and Chevron step two as well.' 35 Those opinions simply cite
the Court's opinions for the broad proposition that stare decisis always trumps
Chevron deference. Other circuit court opinions recognize, however, that the
relationship between circuit court precedents and Chevron is, or should be,
more complicated than can be captured by the simple, mechanical rule that stare
decisis trumps Chevron. Four circuit court opinions contain particularly thoughtful analyses of the relationship between circuit court precedents and Chevron.
In NLRB v. Viola Industries,136 the Tenth Circuit recognized that many
apparent conflicts between judicial precedents and Chevron can be resolved
through the process of careful characterization of the judicial precedents. In the
order that was subject to review in Viola, the NLRB had adopted a construction
of the NLRA that was arguably inconsistent with three pre-Chevron circuit
precedents. After careful analysis of the circuit precedents, however, the court
concluded that there was no conflict. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the basis
for those judicial decisions was not clear. Specifically, the court could not
determine from reading the prior circuit opinions whether they were based on
an independent judicial construction of the statute or were instead based on a
137
judicial determination that the agency's construction was reasonable.
The circuit precedents cited, and relied upon, a pre-Chevron Supreme Court
precedent. 138 That precedent was also difficult to interpret, however. The Court
had applied the then-existing agency construction that was inconsistent with the
134. The Court uses "permissible" and "reasonable" interchangeably. Compare Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43, 866 (agency's construction must be "permissible") with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45, 865
(agency's construction must be "reasonable"). For an explanation of the relationship between Chevron
and the "reasonableness" of agency construction, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (3d ed. Supp. 1996).
135. See, e.g., Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
136. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
137. Id. at 1394.
138. McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983).

2254

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:2225

new agency construction at issue in Viola to a dispute between private parties.
The Court did not indicate whether its decision was based on a judicial
determination that the statute could only bear that construction or a judicial
determination that the agency's construction was reasonable. However, this
Supreme Court precedent cited and relied upon a prior Supreme Court precedent.' 39 The court analyzed that opinion with care and concluded that it was
based on the Court's determination that the agency construction was "reasonable," and not on an independent judicial determination that the statute could
only bear the agency's construction.' 4 °
Once the court concluded that none of the circuit or Supreme Court precedents were based on a judicial determination that the statute could bear only the
construction that was inconsistent with the agency construction at issue in Viola,
it found that there was no conflict between stare decisis and Chevron. 141 Thus,
the court was required to review the agency's construction at issue in Viola
through application of Chevron's two-step test. The court upheld the new
agency construction based on its determinations that the statutory language was
sufficiently ambiguous to support the new agency construction and that the new
agency construction was "reasonable," in the sense that the agency had provided an adequate explanation for its decision to change its construction of the
Act based on its reassessment of the effects of its prior construction. 142 The
that had reached the same conclusion
Tenth Circuit cited a Third Circuit14 opinion
3
reasoning.
similar
of
use
through
139. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. 335 (1978).
140. Viola, 979 F.2d at 1393.
141. Id. at 1394.
142. Id. at 1394-96.
143. Id. at 1394 (citing International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 775-77 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding earlier Supreme Court opinions merely
reviewed and upheld prior agency interpretation of NLRA, rather than imposing a judicial construction
of the statute)).
One judge dissented in Viola. He agreed with the majority's characterization of one of the Supreme
Court's precedent decisions and with the majority's conclusions that the agency's construction of the
statute was both "defensible" and "more effectively achieves the objectives of the statute." Viola, 979
E2d at 1397 (Baldlock, J., dissenting). He disagreed, however, with the majority's characterization of
the other Supreme Court precedent and of the circuit precedents. Id. at 1397-99. He noted that the
second Supreme Court opinion was not issued in the context of judicial review of an agency decision
but in the context of judicial resolution of a dispute between two private parties. Thus, even though the
Court relied on its prior decision that had upheld the agency's construction as "reasonable," the
dissenting judge expressed the view that the second decision necessarily was based on a judicial
determination that the agency's prior construction was correct, rather than merely "reasonable." Id. at
1398-99. He also interpreted the three circuit precedents as adopting the prior agency construction as a
rule of law rather than merely as a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute. Id. at 1399. Based
on his interpretation and characterization of the pre-Chevron judicial precedents, the dissenting judge
expressed the view that the court was constitutionally precluded from according the new agency
construction Chevron deference. In his words, "once the Supreme Court states what the law is .... the
agency loses its authority to interpret the statute in a contrary, albeit reasonable, manner." Id. That
assertion is accurate, of course-neither an agency nor a circuit court has the power to overrule a
Supreme Court precedent-but it is based on a mistaken premise. Contrary to the view expressed by the
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The D.C. Circuit's decision in Chemical Waste Management v. EPA' 44 goes a
step beyond the Tenth and Third Circuit opinions interpreting and characterizing
judicial precedents under the NLRA. In Chemical Waste Management, the court
was called upon to review an agency rule that adopted a construction of the
statutory term "public hearing." The agency concluded that the requirement to
provide such a hearing could be met by providing an opportunity for a written
exchange of data and views. That construction of the term conflicted with a
pre-Chevron circuit precedent that interpreted "public hearing" to mean an oral
evidentiary hearing. 145 The circuit precedent could only be interpreted as a
judicial interpretation of the statute, since the court reversed an agency construction identical to the construction at issue in Chemical Waste Management. Thus,
the court could not characterize the circuit precedent in a manner that eliminated any conflict between stare decisis and Chevron.
The court considered the issuance of the new agency rule an appropriate
vehicle for reconsideration of its pre-Chevron circuit precedent. The court
concluded that it had to overrule the circuit precedent as inconsistent with
Chevron.146 It concluded that the circuit precedent constituted an impermissible
judicial imposition of its own construction of an ambiguous agency-administered statute. The court went on to uphold the agency construction as "reasonable," and to overrule the circuit precedent.1 47 The panel decision in Chemical
Waste Management was a de facto unanimous en banc decision, since the panel
circulated the draft opinion to1 4 all
members of the circuit for their approval
8
issued.
was
decision
the
before
The Second Circuit's opinion in Schisler v. Sullivan149 goes a step beyond the
D.C. Circuit's opinion in Chemical Waste Management. In Schisler, the court
reviewed a legislative rule issued by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) in which the agency announced criteria for determining whether
an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The
150
criteria announced in the rule were inconsistent with four circuit precedents.

dissenting judge, the Court routinely applies "reasonable" agency constructions of ambiguous agencyadministered statutes in the process of resolving disputes between private parties. See, e.g., Wilder v.
Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519 n.17 (1990) (discussing calculation methods for rates
reasonably related to costs of an efficient hospital); Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 432 (1987) (discussing guidelines for establishing utility allowance); Visiting Nurses Ass'n of
North Shore v. Butler, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying numerous agency constructions of statute
in process of resolving private right of action dispute); see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr. Agency
Authority to Define the Scope of PrivateRights ofAction, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1996).
144. 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc).
145. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1444 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. Chemical Waste Management, 873 F.2d at 1482.
147. Id. at 1482-83.
148. Id. at 1482.
149. 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993).
150. Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988); Schisler v. Heckler, 787 E2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986);
Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1984); Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Two of those precedents were pre-Chevron, but the other two were postChevron.
The pre-Chevron circuit precedents were obvious examples of judicial impositions of statutory constructions that Chevron prohibited prospectively. The
circuit nevertheless continued to adhere to those precedents in its two postChevron decisions. 15 1 The court initially refused to reconsider those precedents
in light of Chevron because the agency had not announced its contrary construction in a form that was entitled to Chevron deference. In the prior cases, HHS
had announced its construction in the form of an interpretative rule. Most courts
and scholars believe that Chevron deference does not, or at least52 should not,
apply to statutory constructions announced in interpretative rules. 1
In Schisler, the court distinguished between the modest deference due an
agency construction adopted in an interpretative rule and the much greater
deference due the same construction when it is contained in a legislative rule
that is promulgated through use of the notice and comment procedure. The court
held that it was required to accord Chevron deference to an agency construction
adopted in a legislative rule. 153 It then concluded that the construction contained
in the HHS rule was a "reasonable" construction of an ambiguous statute. 154 In
reaching that conclusion, the court was influenced by the agency's use of notice
and comment procedure to consider with care the likely effects of adopting
various alternative constructions of the statute and the agency's reasoning
supporting the construction it had chosen.15 5 The court concluded that, "[b]ecause the regulations are valid, they are binding on the courts. Any other
conclusion would result in ...chaos .... The "chaos" to which the court
referred was the prior situation in which the agency's Administrative Law
Judges confronted inconsistent, putatively binding instructions from HHS and
from various circuit courts.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Aguirre v. INS 157 illustrates a variation of the
theme reflected in opinions like Schisler and Chemical Waste Management. The

151. See Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988); Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1986).
152. See, e.g., Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1994)
(reasoning EPA's interpretive rule not entitled to Chevron deference because not published for comment
or made to undergo other regulatory formalities); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning EPA's intrepretive rule not
entitled to Chevron deference because not a regulation); Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1994)
(reasoning Bureau of Prison's interpretation not entitled to Chevron deference because merely internal
agency guidelines not subject to rigors of Administrative Procedure Act); see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 5, § 3.5; Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the
Courts? 7 YAE J. ON REG. 1 (1990). For a discussion of the many confusing and conflicting opinions
addressing this issue, see DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 134, § 3.5.
153. Schisler, 3 F.3d at 568.
154. Id. at 568-69.
155. Id. at 566-69.
156. Id. at 568.
157. 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996).
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court was called upon to review a decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that was predicated on an agency construction of the relevant
statute that was inconsistent with a circuit precedent.' 5 8 The opinion in the
precedent case was issued long after Chevron, and the reasoning in the precedent opinion left no doubt that the court had resolved an issue of law. The
precedent opinion stated that the statutory interpretation it adopted was compelled by the "plain language" of the "unambiguous" statute. 59 Thus, the court
was confronted with a clear conflict between a circuit precedent announcing a
statutory interpretation as a rule of law within the meaning of Chevron and the
agency's new construction of the statute. No amount of characterization or
recharacterization of the precedent could eliminate that conflict.
Yet, the court upheld the agency construction. The court noted that INS had
announced its intention not to acquiesce to the statutory interpretation contained
in the circuit precedent in cases that arise outside the circuit. 16 0 It also recognized that the Supreme Court was unlikely to resolve the conflict between the
circuit's interpretation and the agency's construction promptly, if ever.' 6 ' Thus,
the court described the situation as creating "a tension between our traditional
respect for Circuit precedent ... and our frequently expressed concern to avoid
62
disparate treatment of similarly situated aliens under the immigration laws." 1
The court interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions resolving conflicts between stare decisis and Chevron as holding that Chevron deference "cannot
compel a court to forgo the principle of stare decisis." 163 It concluded, however,
that those opinions do not prevent a court from:

making an independent decision whether a particular case now requires a
revised reading of a statute .... "The issue here is not whether courts must
take direction from an agency ruling, but whether they may voluntarily accept
such guidance for the purpose of achieving a satisfactory statutory interpretation."

164

The court determined that the agency decision adopting a new construction of
the statute, combined with the lack of national uniformity created by its circuit
precedent, justified its reconsideration of that precedent. On reconsideration, the
court concluded that the "statutory point is fairly debatable" and that the
agency's construction is reasonable. 165 With the approval of the members of the
panel who decided the precedent case, and with the acquiescence of all other
158. Jenkins v. INS, 32 E3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 14.
160. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Kinder, 64 E3d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1995) (Leval,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996)).
165. Id. at 317-18.
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the court overruled the circuit precedent and upheld the
members of the circuit,
66
1
construction.
agency
To summarize, each of four circuit court decisions I have described and one
subset of the Supreme Court decisions-the Court's decisions resolving conflicts between Chevron and administrative stare decisis-reflect a careful attempt to identify the values that are furthered by the two doctrines and to
resolve conflicts, or apparent conflicts, between them in a manner that maximizes their net value to society and to the legal system. In contrast, the Supreme
Court's opinions that simply adopt mechanical rules for resolving conflicts that
arise in other contexts and the circuit opinions that simply transpose those rules
into the context of conflicts between Chevron and circuit precedents reflect little
consideration of the values that underlie the two doctrines. As a result, those
mechanical rules create suboptimal results by attaching too little significance to
the values that are furthered by Chevron and by administrative stare decisis, and
attaching undue significance to the values that are furthered by judicial stare
decisis.
IV.

INTEGRATING CHEVRON AND STARE DECISIS

Any systematic framework for resolving conflicts, or apparent conflicts,
between Chevron and stare decisis should be shaped in part by recognition of
the reality that many of the values underlying stare decisis apply to agency
precedents and circuit court precedents as well as to Supreme Court precedents.
That analytical framework should recognize that the Chevron doctrine also
furthers many of the values that justify the practice of stare decisis. In Part II, I
identified six values that are furthered by stare decisis: (1) conserving scarce
resources; (2) inducing foresight in decisionmaking; (3) protecting institutional
reputation; (4) reducing variations among individual decisionmakers; (5) enhancing intertemporal equity; and (6) protecting reliance interests. All of these
values, except for the protection of institutional reputation, are furthered by
stare decisis at the agency and circuit court levels to the same extent that they
are furthered by stare decisis at the Supreme Court level. Indeed, one of the
values-protecting reliance interests-is furthered by administrative stare decisis to a greater extent than it is furthered by judicial stare decisis. Moreover,
another of the values-inducing foresight in decisionmaking-is furthered to a
as required by
greater extent by deferring to an agency's statutory construction
167
precedents.
judicial
to
adherence
unblinking
by
than
Chevron
Of the five categories of conflict between Chevron and stare decisis discussed
in Part III, only in conflicts between agency precedents and Chevron step two
has the analytical approach taken by the Supreme Court recognized this reality.168 It has done so by requiring agencies to reconcile conflicts between the
166. Id. at 316, 318 & n.2.
167. See supra Part IB.
168. See supra Part hID.
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values of Chevron and the values of administrative stare decisis. A court will
uphold an agency decision that adopts a new construction of an ambiguous
agency-administered statute that is inconsistent with an agency precedent if, and
69
only if, the agency provides an adequate explanation for its change in policy. 1
That explanation must include explicit recognition of the reliance interests
created by the agency precedent and discussion of the mechanisms the agency
has adopted in an effort to protect those reliance interests.17 0
Thus, the current judicial approach to this type of conflict is faithful to the
values underlying both Chevron and stare decisis. The Court's opinions resolving conflicts between Chevron and stare decisis in the other contexts do not
reflect a similarly thoughtful effort to integrate the values furthered by the two
doctrines, however. In other contexts, the Court has adopted mechanical rules
that implicitly attach dispositive significance to Supreme Court precedents and
no significance to agency precedents, to circuit court precedents, or to the
values furthered by Chevron. With this failing in mind, this Part proposes an
alternative methodology for reconciling conflicts between Chevron and stare
decisis, first with respect to conflicts between Supreme Court or circuit precedents and Chevron step two, and second with respect to the conflicts between
circuit or agency precedents and Chevron step one. My proposed methodology
is modeled on the Supreme Court's method of resolving conflicts between
Chevron and administrative stare decisis and on the method illustrated by the
four circuit court opinions discussed in Part IIIE.
A. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SUPREME COURT OR CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS AND CHEVRON
STEP TWO

When a conflict exists between a Supreme Court precedent and Chevron step
two, the Supreme Court has followed a strict rule of adhering to its own
precedents. The lower courts have adhered to this rule, and some circuits have
applied it by analogy in adhering to their own precedents over an agency's
statutory interpretation. The only value of stare decisis that is, in some sense,
unique to Supreme Court precedents is protecting institutional reputation. Of
course, every institution has a legitimate interest in protecting its reputation, but
the Supreme Court's is uniquely powerful. Any diminution in the Court's
reputation has the potential to induce cynicism that can have destructive effects
that are deep, broad, and long-lasting.
Recognition of this potentially powerful justification for adherence to Supreme Court precedents does not support the Court's present purely mechanical
method of resolving apparent conflicts between Supreme Court precedents and
Chevron step two, however. The Court can (and often does) overrule a prece-

169. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983)
(holding agency rescission of motor vehicle safety rule arbitrary and capricious).
170. See supra note 84.
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dent without suffering any injury to its reputation. 171 Except in relatively rare
cases in which the relevant audience extends beyond the "elites" that study the
Court's opinions with care, the Court can enhance its institutional reputation by
in which it explains with care why it has decided to overrule
issuing an opinion
72
a precedent. 1
In the context of conflicts between stare decisis and Chevron step two, the
circuit court opinions described in Part 1m1 illustrate ways in which courts can
further simultaneously the values of Chevron and stare decisis. There is no
evidence to suggest that the Second, Third, Tenth, or D.C. Circuits have
suffered any diminution in institutional reputation, or caused any other damage
to the values of stare decisis, through the actions they took in those cases.
Conversely, those decisions furthered the values that underlie the Chevron
doctrine.
A court that is confronted with an apparent conflict between Chevron step
two and stare decisis should begin by following the lead of the Third and Tenth
Circuits to determine whether an agency's construction of an ambiguous statute
truly does conflict with that precedent. 173 It should analyze with care the
precedent that appears to conflict with the agency construction at issue. If the
precedent merely upheld a prior inconsistent agency construction, there is no
conflict between stare decisis and Chevron. The Court could have avoided the
devastating effects of its misguided decision in Maislin simply by taking this
logical first step. 174 The 1915 precedent the Court applied in Maislin merely
upheld a prior agency construction of the ICA. 175 That agency construction was
consistent with the regulatory policies the agency was implementing in 1915,
but it was totally inconsistent with the deregulatory policies the agency was
required to implement in 1990.176 Properly characterized, the precedent was not
inconsistent with the agency construction of the ICA.
If careful analysis of the precedent decision yields a conclusion that the
precedent is inconsistent with the agency's construction of an ambiguous statute, a court should follow the lead of the Second and D.C. Circuits. 177 It should
use the occasion of the announcement of the agency construction as an indication of the need to reconsider the precedent. In a significant proportion of such
cases, the court is likely to conclude that it should overrule the precedent and

171. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2298-300 (1995) (abandoning the methodology
announced in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)), cited in Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolutionof the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1988-89 (1996).
172. See supra Part Ilc.
173. See NLRB v. Viola Industries, 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 104-14; see also Pierce, supra note 55, at 766-76.
175. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915); see also supra text
accompanying notes 104-14.
176. See Pierce, supra note 55, at 766-76.
177. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
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uphold the agency construction through application of Chevron, as the Second
Circuit did in Schisler and Aguirre and the D.C. Circuit did in Chemical Waste
Management. As long as the court provides an adequate explanation for its
decision to overrule the precedent and to uphold the agency's construction, it
need have no concern that its action will harm any of the values that are
furthered by stare decisis. 17 8 The Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit gave two
reasons for overruling the circuit precedents at issue in Schisler and Chemical
Waste Management: (1) the statute was sufficiently ambiguous to support the
agency construction, and (2) the agency provided persuasive reasons in support
of its new construction of the statute. 179 Those reasons should be sufficient to
justify a Supreme Court decision to overrule a Supreme Court precedent as
well, particularly when the agency has adopted the new construction through
80
the painstaking process of notice and comment rulemaking. 1
Of course, in some cases, a court will reconsider the precedent in light of the
agency construction but decide for good reasons that it should reaffirm the
precedent or reject the agency construction on other grounds. A court could
justify such a decision on any of four grounds. First, a court might conclude that
the statutory construction announced in the precedent is compelled by the
language of the statute. Second, a court might reaffirm a-precedent because the
statutory interpretation announced in the precedent is required in order to avoid
the need to address a serious question with respect to the constitutionality of the
statute. Many precedents interpreting the NLRA, including the precedents at
issue in Lechmere and Golden State Transit, probably fall in this category. 18 1
Third, a court might refuse to uphold an agency construction inconsistent with a
precedent because the agency provided insufficient reasoning in support of its
178. Of course, if the precedent created reliance interests, overruling it could harm those interests. In
that case, however, a court is more likely to uphold the precedent unless the agency has adopted
sufficient measures to protect those interests, or has provided a sufficient explanation to justify harming
those interests. See infra text accompanying note 182.
179. Schisler, 3 F.3d at 568-69; Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1487-83
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
180. The Second Circuit added a third reason in support of its decision in Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d
315 (2d Cir. 1996)-it could further the interest in obtaining national uniformity by overruling its
precedent and upholding the agency construction. Id. at 317. That consideration is obviously irrelevant
in the process of reconsidering a Supreme Court precedent, however, since national uniformity will be
achieved by any decision the Court makes.
181. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), the Court applied the rule announced in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court reasoned that
the rule it announced "preserves property rights," an apparent reference to the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause problems that would be raised by a rule that allowed union organizers to recruit on
company property in broader circumstances. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), the Court applied the rule
announced in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132 (1976). The rule announced in Machinists was based on a combination of the NLRA and the
Supremacy Clause. Id. at 155.
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1996), applied the rule announced in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The rule
announced in Mackay was influenced by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 347-48.
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construction.' 8 2 Finally, a court might refuse to uphold an agency construction
because the precedent created significant reliance interests and the agency did
not adopt sufficient measures to mitigate the damage to those interests that the
agency construction would cause or provide reasons in support of the new
construction that are sufficient to justify the resulting harm to reliance interests. 183
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CIRCUIT COURT OR AGENCY PRECEDENT

The Court also can improve on its approach to resolution of conflicts between
Chevron step one and precedents at the agency and circuit court level in
deciding "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." The Court has taken a wide variety of inconsistent approaches to
answering this question. 184 In some cases, the Court appears to be willing to
characterize as "ambiguous" any statute that has given rise to conflicting
interpretations. Thus, in its unanimous opinion in Smiley v. Citibank,185 the
Court stated that, in light of the prior conflicting state court interpretations of
the statutory term at issue, "it would be difficult indeed to contend that the
86
[statutory term] is unambiguous with regard to the point at issue here ....
In other cases, however, the Court seems to attach no significance whatsoever to
the existence of long-standing agency and circuit court interpretations of statutes in the process of deciding whether a statute has a "plain meaning" at
variance with the long-standing interpretations of the agency and of many
circuit courts.1 87 In these cases, the Court seems willing to go to extreme
lengths to find "plain meaning" in language that all other institutions have
determined either to be ambiguous or to support a different plain meaning.' 8 8
In deciding cases of this type, the Court should recognize that stare decisis
furthers important values at the agency and circuit court level, as well as at the
Supreme Court level. The Court should exercise caution when it is asked to
overturn a long-standing agency interpretation of a statute, particularly when
multiple circuit courts have long upheld that agency interpretation. Caution is
appropriate in this context for two reasons. First, as the Court recognized in
Smiley, if other legal institutions have adopted different interpretations of the
statute, it is probably ambiguous. 189 When "Congress has directly spoken to the
182. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
183. See supra note 84.
184. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 355-63 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
971-93 (1992); Pierce, supra note 55, at 754-64.
185. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
186. Id. at 1732-34.
187. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S.
328 (1994); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
188. See Pierce, supra note 55, at 754-64.
189. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1732-33.
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precise question at issue," the statute rarely elicits differing interpretations.
Second, long-standing agency precedents and circuit court precedents often
create substantial reliance interests that can be damaged, or destroyed, by a
judicial decision overruling those precedents issued many years after the announcement of the agency's interpretation.' 90 Thus, in this context, courts
should set a high standard for finding that a statute has a plain meaning. By
defining "unambiguous" narrowly, the values underlying both the Chevron
doctrine and stare decisis would be well served.
V. CONCLUSION

Both Chevron and stare decisis further important values. By engaging in
thoughtful integration and coordination of the two doctrines in two contextsconflicts between Chevron and administrative stare decisis and conflicts between Chevron and circuit precedents-courts have maximized the value of the
two doctrines. In other contexts, however, courts have adopted mechanical rules
that unnecessarily sacrifice some of the valuable effects of the two doctrines.
Courts can improve the performance of the legal system by extending into those
contexts the careful methods of integration and conflict resolution that have
produced large net gains in social welfare in the two contexts in which courts
have applied them.

190. See supra Part

11F.

